



One Hundred Eighteenth Congress
Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

June 13, 2023

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

The Honorable Christopher Wray
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Secretary Mayorkas and Director Wray:

On June 8, 2023, the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) reported that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Cuba have reached an agreement for the PRC to establish an electronic espionage facility on the island—just 100 miles from the United States—that would allow the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intelligence services to collect signals intelligence throughout the southeastern United States.¹ Following publication of the WSJ report, John Kirby, spokesperson for the Biden administration’s National Security Council said the report is “not accurate.”² However, in less than 48 hours later an anonymous Biden administration official confirmed to *Politico* that the CCP is using a secret facility in Cuba to spy on the United States since at least 2019.³ This espionage facility could exploit sensitive information from our military bases and critical infrastructure sites. We write to request additional information about this imminent threat to homeland security.

This espionage facility would be the latest in a series of attempts by the CCP to exploit our national security. In February of this year, the Committee on Homeland Security (Committee) Republicans demanded answers regarding the surveillance balloon that the CCP brazenly sent over our nation, collecting intelligence from our most sensitive military and critical infrastructure sites.⁴ A mere two months later, on April 24, 2023, Committee Republicans requested information on another CCP plot—this time regarding CCP-driven police stations in the United States that were being used to spy on and repress PRC nationals.⁵ These activities

¹ Warren P. Strobel and Gordon Lubold, *Cuba to Host Secret Chinese Spy Base Focusing on U.S.*, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2023) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-to-host-secret-chinese-spy-base-focusing-on-u-s-b2fed0e0>.

² *Id.* (“I’ve seen that press report, it’s not accurate.”).

³ Alexander Ward, *China using secret base in Cuba to spy on U.S.*, BIDEN ADMIN OFFICIAL CONFIRMS, POLITICO (June 10, 2023) <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/10/china-secret-base-cuba-spy-00101386>.

⁴ Letter from Rep. Mark E. Green, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., to Hon. Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec & Gen. Glen VanHerck, CMD, NORTHCOM/NORAD (Feb. 14, 2023) available at <https://homeland.house.gov/media/2023/02/2023-02-14-T-DHS-Secretary-and-General-VanHeck-Chinese-Surveillance-Balloon.pdf>.

⁵ Letter from Rep. Mark E. Green, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., to Hon. Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec & Hon. Christopher Wray, Dir., FBI (Apr. 24, 2023) available at

make it clear that the CCP will use every tactic and technique to undermine U.S. sovereignty security.

The CCP's move to expand its sphere of influence by building espionage infrastructure in Cuba echoes Russian aggression during the Cold War, and is a clear and dangerous escalation on the part of the CCP. If the CCP anticipates a major conflict with the United States, it would almost certainly consider conducting cyberattacks against our critical infrastructure.⁶ A CCP espionage facility in Cuba poses a significant counterintelligence threat by providing the CCP vital information regarding U.S. critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Biden administration is turning a blind eye to these warnings and failing to confront our most formidable adversary.

To assist the Committee's continued oversight of the broad and multi-faceted threats posed by the CCP,⁷ better understand the dangers presented of an electronic espionage facility on the island of Cuba, and assess DHS and FBI's efforts to combat these serious threats to U.S. homeland security, we request responses to the following questions as soon as possible, but no later than June 27, 2023.

1. When did the Biden administration become aware of the CCP espionage facility located in Cuba, and when did the facility become operational?
2. What are the known or anticipated surveillance capabilities the CCP espionage facility has in Cuba, including but not limited to collection capability, the range of such collection capability, and the potential for a facility to be weaponized against the U.S. homeland?
3. What is the exact counterintelligence threat posed by such a facility to U.S. homeland security?
4. What counterintelligence capabilities does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have to mitigate the CCP espionage facility's collection capacity, and which of these capabilities have you deployed to mitigate the facility's collection capacity?

<https://homeland.house.gov/media/2023/04/Letter-to-Mayorkas-and-Wray-April-24-2023.pdf>. The April 24, 2023 letter requested responses to several questions by May 8, 2023. Those requests remain outstanding and are now more than one month overdue. We reiterate these long-outstanding requests for information.

⁶ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Feb. 6, 2023) available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.

⁷ *Confronting Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to the U.S. Homeland: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.*, 118th Cong. (Mar. 9, 2023); *A Security Sprint: Assessing the U.S. Homeland's Vulnerabilities to Chinese Communist Party Aggression: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.*, 118th Cong. (May 23, 2023).

5. What are the critical infrastructure sights located within the potential range of the CCP espionage facility, and which are of most concern to national security?
6. How are DHS and the FBI engaging with U.S. critical infrastructure owners and operators to ensure they are prepared for CCP-driven acts of espionage or cyberattacks?

We request that the FBI and DHS provide Committee staff a briefing about the CCP's espionage activities against the U.S. homeland to include, but not limited to, the CCP espionage facility in Cuba, no later than June 27, 2023. To the extent a complete response to this inquiry requires the provision of classified information, please do so under separate cover. Please contact the Committee on Homeland Security Majority staff at (202) 226-8417 with any questions about this request.

Per House Rule X, the Committee on Homeland Security is the principal committee of jurisdiction for overall homeland security policy and has special oversight functions of "all Government activities relating to homeland security, including the interaction of all departments and agencies with the Department of Homeland Security."

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



MARK E. GREEN, MD
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security



AUGUST PFLUGER
Chairman
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence




CARLOS A. GIMENEZ
Chairman
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security



MARJORIE TAYLOR GREENE
Member of Congress

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Director Wray
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Member of Congress



MORGAN LUTTRELL
Member of Congress



DALE W. STRONG
Member of Congress



JOSH BRECHEEN
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable Bennie Thompson, Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Seth Magaziner, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence

The Honorable Shri Thanedar, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security